This paper considers convergence between classical realism and critical theory in relation to pressing political problems. It argues that the spirit of both traditions can help develop critical reflection on the state as an agent of change. I suggest that too much recent critical theorization has avoided the state in its attention to social movements, but that a critical concept of state leadership is now required to address global threats and challenges. The paper rehearses this critical concept in three stages. It considers, first, how the concept of national interest drives statecraft in the authorship of Hans Morgenthau and how complex this concept is both in its own terms and with regard to the political effects of the nuclear revolution. It develops, second, a multi-layered concept of responsibility as the guiding concept of statecraft in a world of increasingly incompatible demands. It argues, third, that these concepts of national interest and responsibility need to be aligned with global imperatives so that a greater marriage between the global and the national is possible. I conclude that it is the task of contemporary critical thought to address this present through a reimagined political realism.
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That classical realism and critical theory meet in an understanding of, and political response to, the present may seem perplexing, particularly to those studying international relations through the lens of critical theory or to those in classical realism that have recently emphasized its more meta-theoretical credentials.
2 Indeed one might precisely argue that where classical realism and critical theory meet is in a particular distance to the present. This distance affords a critical approach to dominant modes of thought and behaviour, one lost if 'truth' comes too close to 'power' and loses extrasystemic leverage on structures of domination. This judgment is intellectually pertinent, informing part of the critical gesture behind the recent retrieval of classical realism from the IR schools of structural realism and neorealism. That said, I consider it equally critical to re-emphasize the importance of the present in both classical realism and critical theory given contemporary need for political imagination.
For the classical realists of the 1940s and 1950s (in particular, E.H. Carr, John
Herz, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Arnold Wolfers), theoretical reflection always stemmed from, and was rooted in, a practical context. Reflection on the tenets of political realism, on national interest and power dynamics and on the security dilemma and nuclear weaponry were made in the immediate context of what was interpreted to be contemporary international reality: the failure of liberal internationalism, a system of states, and an ideologically polarized world of nations. The 'classical realism' of this period constitutes a family set (in the Wittgensteinian sense) of theoretical responses to this international predicament. The political morality of prudent statecraft, with which this set is closely identified, constitutes, in turn, the practically oriented theoretical outcome of these responses (Brown, 2012; Lang, 2004; Molloy, 2009; .
In these two respects-without being either presentist or subservient to present political actors or power structures-classical realism is a theory of, and for, the present.
As for critical theory, the temporal modality of its disposition towards political reality is more complex, but also oriented towards the present. In "Traditional and
Critical Theory' Max Horkheimer makes four claims for critical theory (Horkheimer, 1937) . First, in distinction to positivism, it is comprehensive in its understanding of social processes (hence the Frankfurt School's debt to critical political economy on the determining contradictions of capitalism). Second, in distinction to both abstract theory and the theorizing of successive periods of history, it works 'with time' (233) in the sense that it is both aware of its historical conditions and aware of its temporal relation to the historical practices of contemporary society. Third, as practical theory, it considers itself 'an element in action leading to new social forms', as a 'force stimulating social change' . Fourth, in distinction to the policy dimension of positivist theory and science, this practical nature is geared to the normative end of emancipation: a society of peoples free from domination (230-1). In sum, in comparison with previous conceptions of theory, Horkheimer defines 'critical' theory as comprehensive, historical, practical and normative. Critical theorizing entails, accordingly, addressing present societal problems in such as way as not to repeat the present, but open it up to the future, to seek, that is, the present's normative 'transformation'. While rightly refusing a political agent of historical transformation, critical theory's theoretical and practical force regarding the present has, however, become increasingly dissipated for internal and external reasons. Externally, the functional speed and social complexity of modernizing processes has undermined the 'comprehensive' nature of critical theory and marginalized it in political debate.
Internally, when this non-comprehensive and marginal fate of critical theorizing has been consciously assumed (as with poststructuralist theory from the 1980s onwards), critical theory has often abandoned the public sphere to other forces (Beardsworth, 2011: 199-226) . The contemporary poverty of post-Cold War liberalism (including its present structural inability to deal with nationalism) has been one consequence of critiquing political debate from the social and cultural margins, rather than deepening it, comprehensively, at its political and economic center. 3 As a form of historical theorizing, critical theory should, I believe, return to an understanding of itself as 'transformative' of the present. Given this understanding of critical theorizing I consider that it is in the temporal dimension of the present and in this present's problems that these two different bodies of contemporary international theory meet.
What, then, is the present of international politics? What are the problems of international politics that organize its present and to which morally informed theory responds? There is always room for subjective arbitrariness in an answer to this question, one predicated on the prejudices or preferences of the observer. That said, there is a cluster of problems that insist at the international level because they prove resistant to solution and because they have thrown up many unanswered conceptual and practical questions. These problems are what are called 'global threats and challenges'. 4 To differing extents, they affect in fact or in principle all peoples of the world: nuclear armament, climate change and its effects (new migration patterns, food and water sustainability, etc.), terrorism, health pandemics, and poverty and increasing inequality.
Of a global dimension or with global effect, these problems define the present less because they are of the present than because, remaining intractable within the present international political order, they insist as the present. It is evident that solutions to these problems require effective cooperation between states. What is not evident is how to engineer that cooperation or how to present stepping-stones to a different political order that would mitigate the need for inter-state cooperation in the first place. In the so-called 'gap' between global problems and political solutions to them (what is presently called 'global governance failure' (Goldin, 2013) , 'deadlock' (Victor, 2011) , or 'gridlock' (Hale et al., 2013) two things are therefore clear. First, there is a lack of political solutions to global problems; second, there is a lack of critical theoretical reflection that would help foster these political solutions.
5
In this present how do the two international theories of classical realism and critical theory meet and help? Since these global problems pose critical questions regarding the survival and/or welfare of humanity within modernizing processes, answers to this question are more than important, necessarily resonating with the larger themes of this special issue on modernity and crisis. To kick-start my argument, I suggest among others, and somewhat straightforwardly, that, rather than looking to solutions to global problems in global terms and at a global level (as has been the habit of international liberalism since the end of the Cold War), theorists confront the crisis of global governance in national terms and from the national level upwards. As Ian Goldin succinctly puts it, solutions to global problems must begin with the nation-state and with the preferences of state leaders (Goldin, 2013: 54) . In more theoretical terms, in a world order still structured by the independence of states-however interdependent this world has at the same time become-the state must be considered not the obstacle, but the very means to effective and legitimate global governance arrangements. give its critique of the contemporary global order, critical reflection of the last twentyfive years has turned theoretical attention away from the state and focused on global civil society, post-national politics, and/or cosmopolitan orders (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Habermas, 1996; Hayden, 2005; Scholte, 2011; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999 Morgenthau (1952a; 1952b; 1954; and Reinhold Niebuhr (2002; , foreign policy and international diplomacy is made intelligible through reference to the concept of 'national interest'. It is a commonplace of IR theory that, by defining foreign policy in these terms, the mid-twentieth century classical realists were attacking liberal internationalism and, at the same time, laying the conceptual groundwork for the emergent discipline of IR. Due to their re-interpretation over the last decade, it is also a commonplace that the notion of national interest is less a functional than a relational and moral concept (Bacevich, 2008; Bell, 2008; Cozette, 2008; Lebow, 2001; T. Smith, 2010; (Morgenthau, 1952a; 1952b; 1952c; 1954; (Morgenthau, 1952a: 970) . The statesperson is the one who protects the nation in these terms, and it is this concept of statecraft that citizens of nation-states are still most familiar with when the concepts of 'national interest' and 'national security' are wielded in the public realm. Second, as the above notion of national sacrifice already presupposes, national interest concerns political and cultural identity. It is a duty of state leadership to defend the moral and political values of the nation (whatever national history, sectional interests or basic consensus have decided the tenor of these values). Third, to defend these interests must be done in such a way that this defense is compatible with, indeed includes, the interests of other nations, and vice versa (Morgenthau, 1952a: 978, 985-7) . National interest is not, in other words, geared to the sovereign right of power except in conditions of immediate national survival (layer one). Rather, as a relational practice of power/interest with regard to other powers and interests, the idea and practice of the national interest connote responsibilities towards others' interests and towards world order. Hence why, for Morgenthau, the more power a nation holds, the more related it is to other political entities than itself, and therefore, the more responsibilities it bears. For classical realism, 'great power' entails 'great responsibility' in this sense (Claude, 1986;  compare Bukovansky et al., 2012) . Just as rights and responsibilities are inseparable in the liberal polity, so power and responsibility are inextricable in the international system of states. Despite its critique of liberal rationalism the classical realist notion of interest as responsibility is, accordingly, profoundly liberal (see . (Morgenthau 1954 (Morgenthau , 1960b . In a pluralist world of nation-states, the exercise of national self-restraint and the negotiation of interests towards the common good of international order constitute the major political virtues of the statesperson.
In sum, if the concept of national interest is, for Morgenthau, to guide foreign policy, all foreign policy converges on a political morality of prudence in three senses.
The statesperson acts prudently first, by protecting his or her peoples from existential threats; second, by limiting violence between international political entities-in Burkean terms, 'the law of neighborhood' and 'the rules of prudence' (Burke, 2011) ; third, by leading responsibly in the international environment through the example of national interest and its conduct, not by a universalist conception of this interest's general applicability (Morgenthau, 1960b: 34) . These three points are well known to contemporary students of IR due both to the recent revival of classical realism and to the fact that effective criticism of neoconservative American foreign policy from 2001 to Smith, 2010; Williams, , 2007 . Indeed, the revival of classical realism and criticisms of G.W. Bush's state leadership in the world are not unrelated. Bush's piloting of international crusades, in the name of freedom, smacked of political moralism, not political morality; it was therefore an important intellectual exercise to resurrect classical realism for theoretical and practical purposes (Beardsworth, 2011: 75-110 ).
However 
II. The dilemma of classical realism: three arguments in response
In his intellectual history of the founders of American Realism, Glimmer of a New Leviathan, Campbell Craig rehearses how Niebuhr and Morgenthau came to understand that the threat of nuclear war undermined the long-term survival of the human species.
Niebuhr considered more quickly than Morgenthau a nuclear war unwinnable, but offered no solution to the nuclear dilemma bar peaceful coexistence between the USA and Soviet
Union. As we saw above, Morgenthau came to see by the end of the 1950s that nuclear war undermined the foundation of Realism (the first layer of national interest: biological survival in international politics) and that, therefore, national interest and sovereignty had to cede to a supranational monopoly of nuclear force. Craig argues that, for Morgenthau, a world state is only possible if there is a global community underpinning the will to institute it, and that this community might emerge specifically through collective fear of human self-destruction. For Craig, however, Morgenthau never pursued this line of thinking, distracted by the more immediate concerns of the Vietnam War and by the very difficulty of the intellectual project he envisaged. He sees no answer in the Waltzian solution of managed nuclear proliferation, concluding that, based on statistical probability, 'the continuation of anarchy will sooner or later lead to nuclear war' (Craig, 2003: 172) . While Craig pinpoints, therefore, the importance of Morgenthau's normative and analytical argument for world government (in specific regard to the monopoly of nuclear violence), there is no new theoretical framework in his otherwise excellent intellectual history that suggests what states and state leaders might do to transcend the nuclear dilemma.
In Bounding Power, Daniel Deudney inscribes the nuclear dilemma of classical realism into republican security theory. Given the evolutionary materialist logic of violent interdependence, nuclear weapons, with both their global range and global destructive capabilities, no longer fit the modern political order of the nation-state.
Morgenthau's world-statism (what Deudney calls 'a nuclear one-worldism' particular to the 1940s-60s) is, however, neither desired nor feasible (Deudney, 2007: 244-64 (Scheuerman, 2011: 41) , the monopoly functions of the state must nevertheless be reinstituted at the global level for a democratic political and legal global order to be possible in the first place (138). In sum, both security from arbitrary power and redistribution of resources for social justice require, at whatever level of human organization, organized coercion. Morgenthau is therefore right to argue for world-statism and correctly identified the need for greater global social integration to underpin it. Scheuerman's concern is essentially with political economy. It would nevertheless appear that, for him, there will be no solution to the nuclear dilemma until, either through catastrophe or coercion, nuclear-armed states give up their own monopoly on nuclear force. The world state (not global governance)
provides, consequently, the right horizon for practically minded reformers, however distant its concretization. The nuclear dilemma is not resolved by The Realist Case for Global Reform, but rather rehearsed to such intensity and social and economic generality that the normative and analytical argument for world government appears persuasive to 'critically minded students of global politics' (173).
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Of these three responses to the classical realist dilemma-that the pursuit of national interest is incompatible with modern technology, which requires supranational organization-two (Craig and Scheuerman) The starting-place for English School IR thought are the international values, norms, and rules formed through the emergence and interaction of states (Bull, 1977; Bull and Watson, 1984 Critical reflection on this new historical situation can, however, serve both to understand the processes that bring about this situation and bring to bear upon it an appropriate, publicly rehearsed sense of political responsibility and judgment.
14 Third, at the same time, this last point has to be addressed more ambitiously. As the introduction argued, the present can be defined by the tension between an increasing set of global problems and a robust system of developed, developing and failing states. suggest, needed.
15
First, regarding the negative effects of a trans-border event, a general, public argument needs to be made that it is the responsibility of the office-holders of the state to manage these effects in the name of the welfare of its citizens. For the moment this argument is publicly rehearsed regarding terrorism, migration flows, and health pandemics. Very little is, however, rehearsed publicly within a general problematic of trans-border threats as such. This problematic should include global finance, climate change and nuclear proliferation. The point is that state leaders should hold themselves responsible-and, therefore, be held accountable by their citizenry-for the effects of these phenomena because they affect the welfare of their citizens. Jackson's distinctions consider neither this notion of responsibility nor the risk of leadership that accompanies
it. An argument concerning needs is not however enough to stimulate political imagination, except in the case of immediate existential threat.
Second, events of a global nature that affect national citizenry and that necessitate national leadership and international collective action require a political language that goes to the roots of political identity: citizenship. The key concept here is that of freedom (or, actively put, emancipation). As republican thinkers have recently begun to articulate, a marriage between the national and the global (in my terms) can be forged politically through an expansion of a more republican than liberal understanding of freedom.
Returning to the Roman idea of liber, the freeman, Philip Pettit argues for example, that either an individual and/or a collective is free as long as its ability to choose what it wishes is not only not hindered by another agent (the liberal idea of freedom) but is independent of the volition of another agent tout court (Pettit, 2007 (Pettit, , 2014 . Third, the first two arguments concern global problems, the state and its own citizens. The question of responsibility towards non-citizens comes up, however, in their very exposition. In terms of the first argument, meeting the needs of non-citizens helps meet the needs of one's own. Here, in comparison with Robert Jackson's approach, there is no 'incompatibility', no 'hard choice' between national and humanitarian responsibility. One hears this argument regarding present migration flows to the European continent. Development of sub-Saharan Africa is not only a moral imperative in the name of basic human interests; it is a political imperative of national security. The securitization of development concerns should be handled prudently by the state since the argument can quickly revert into isolationism and exclusionism when national wealth is spent. That said, the argument is not false and provides, more importantly, a baseline for a more reflective, republican-type argument. As Pettit has argued, if events or agents are preventing citizens of other states from enjoying their freedom, the republican obligation is to assist them if this is their expressed wish or to assist the foreign state in such a way that it can assume its own duty to its citizens (Pettit, 2014: 177) . The proof of these largely theoretical arguments is, of course, in the pudding: the concrete forms of statecraft that they help to encourage. Since statecraft is not a science, and since prudence is a practical skill, these arguments serve only to frame political imagination at a moment when the gap between the national and the global has to be 
Conclusion
This paper has argued that a fruitful meeting-place between classical realism and critical theory-under the general rubric of modernity, crisis and humanity-is to be found in our global present and in political responses to it. Given the gap between global problems and solutions to them, which characterizes this present, the latter requires progressive state action to forge international cooperation between states and the pooling and cession of national sovereignty where governance imperatives require. Everything that this article has argued, the critical theorist might say, explores a set of priorities and range of possibilities within the state system. It is within this system that the nuclear dilemma insists as our present in the first place, and it is only within this system that the language and the problematic of 'state prudence' and 'state responsibility' have pertinence to begin with. As a result, these languages of prudence and responsibility perpetuate a system that needs to be transformed as such for critical thought and action to be possible. Perpetuating the system, whatever their intentions (that is, to one side of power-drives), state leaders cannot be critical. The paper's perspective throughout this argument therefore loses critical thought in the very gesture with which it attempts to regain it for the present. In doing so, it returns the present to the repetition of existing power structures and betrays the final purpose of critical theory: emancipation. It is responsible, rather, not to engage with state power and responsibility.
This retort is elegant but flawed: answering it clarifies my rehearsal of the term 'critical' in the introduction and my use of it throughout this article.
First, if critical thought entails historical theorizing, then it cannot itself stand outside of time. The object of critique does not only change through history; the notion of critique must change as well. I said in the introduction that the family traits of critique converge in its transformative relation to the present. As for the early Frankfurt School, this relation has deep roots in an amalgamation of Kantian critique and Marxian critical political economy. As has been well researched over the last half-century, these modalities of critique no longer stand up in the same way that they could in earlier modernity. Kant's critique of the limits of reason presupposes the fact of reason in the first place: an assumption that allows him to short-circuit history and posit liberal teleology. Marx, in contrast, can only posit the object of capital and its immanent contradictions based on a 'supply-side' understanding of value (labour value). Without this assumption, the 'contradictions' of capitalism revert to tensions, and alternatives to it-as the 2007/8 financial crisis showed again-can be quickly marginalized. This is not to say that the critical gestures delimiting illusions of thought or de-reifying what appears natural or social givens do not remain important critical enterprises (see Linklater, 1998 ).
My point is, rather, that to stand outside the system is not presently possible and that one still needs to think through the political consequences of this historical and theoretical point.
To argue that a gesture is only politically critical if it is made outside the system is, for the same reason, untenable. French critical thought from the 1980s onwardsJacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and Jean-Francois Lyotard, following in part the negative dialectics of Theodor Adorno-punctured effectively the illusion of thinking in extra-systemic and/or holistic terms. They lost, however, in so doing, comprehensive normative vision and, correlatively, a sense of political specificity: the absolute need to draw a line in the sand to counter-effect other forces in the political field (Beardsworth, 2011: 224-6) . It is critical today-in both senses of the term: urgent and reflective-to think and implement differently the sense of what is critical and not to oppose it to those who hold power. 18 Unable today to stand outside the system, critique must also work within it and transform its own terms of self-understanding.
Second, this means, in the context of political transformation in a changing system of states, looking not only to global civil society, but also to the state to be an agent of change.
Third, looking directly to the state to address effective change redounds also to the fact that the state constitutes the most intense and conflicting site of transformation at this historical juncture. Too much critical thought has circumvented the state although it is within the changing parameters of the state that effective leverage on trans-border problems is possible. Such circumvention vacates the force field of politics to contemporary nationalisms.
Fourth, and finally, my critical theorist might still retort that critical theory seeks deeper terms of transformation when addressing the present; and that, to use the language of Thomas Kuhn and Robert Cox, forsaking new paradigms of thought returns one to 'problem-solving' reflection within the present paradigm (Cox, 1996: 207-8) . I have effectively questioned this distinction in point one above. It is, however, worth noting further that the problem with this critical standpoint is less that it does not offer feasible alternatives to the present all the while critiquing it (see Brown, 2012) Linklater (1990 Linklater ( , 1998 Linklater ( , 2007 ; Price and Reus-Smit (1998); Walker (1992 Walker ( , 2010 ; Wyn-Jones (2001 . For meta-theoretical considerations of mid-twentieth century classical realism, see Bain (2000) ; Behr and Roesch (2012) ; Guilhot (2011); Lebow 13 In comparison, IGOs and NGOs are relatively thin sites of global social processes:
hence why their responsibilities are less. This may make them more functional, but, by the same token, it makes them less politically agential. 14 The seminal work of Andrew Linklater has been addressing the first of these issues for the last decade (Linklater 2007 (Linklater , 2010 (Linklater , 2011 . This paper constitutes one attempt to address the second. 15 For a more detailed republican argument on this alignment, see Beardsworth 2015. 16 Pettit places this logic under the heading of 'globalized sovereignty ' (185-6) .
17 See Foley (2014) for a comprehensive analysis of contemporary methodologies in political leadership studies. 18 The referendum for 'Brexit' is testimony to this point.
